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Abstract 
 
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is an interactive 
proof that allows a prover to prove the knowledge of a 
secret to a verifier without revealing it. ZKPs are 
powerful tools to deal with critical applications in 
security e-commerce. Existing ZKPs are iterative in 
nature; their protocols require multiple communica-
tion rounds. The cost of iteration makes ZKPs unsuit-
able in practice. We propose a new protocol that meets 
all the requirements of ZKPs, yet runs in one round. 
The new approach substantially reduces computation 
and communications costs. It makes ZKPs more 
suitable for practical cryptographic systems for both 
govern-ment and commercial applications.  
 
 
Index terms – Zero-knowledge proofs, identity theft, 
computer security, e-commerce, trusted computing, 




A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is an interactive 
proof between two parties: prover and verifier, where 
the prover proves the possession of a secret without 
revealing any information about the secret itself. ZKPs 
were first introduced in 1985 for identity verification 
systems [9] and became powerful tools for many 
cryptographic applications [5]. There has been a 
growing concern about the risk of identity theft in 
critical situations, like computer security and e-
commerce applications. ZKPs are the ideal solution to 
challenges in identification since they allow customers 
to prove identities without exchanging sensitive 
information that may lead to identity theft.  
In e-commerce applications, such as identity 
verification, researchers have proposed different 
solutions for different challenges. However, most of the 
traditional verification solutions are based on obtaining 
more information from the user, like: zip code, secret 
PIN, etc. If not handled properly, this private 
information can be a source of future fraud [4]. Even 
without the risk of possible future fraud, revealing such 
personal information undermines customers’ privacy. 
 There has always been a trade-off between security 
and privacy in many identification schemes. The 
customer gains the trust of the service provider by 
divulging additional private information. For example, 
when calling a credit card customer service, the 
representative might ask for zip code, date of birth, or 
mother’s maiden name to verify the caller. The more 
the trust needed to be established, the more the 
customer needs to give out. Therefore, using a 
verification system that protects privacy and security at 
the same time becomes essential [5].  
Many researchers have shown that ZKP can be 
alternatively utilized in e-commerce applications, such 
as smart cards [14], digital cash [2], anonymous 
communication [6], electronic voting [1], public-key 
cryptography [10], multimedia security and digital 
watermarks [3]. 
Existing ZKPs are iterative in nature; their 
protocols  require multiple communication rounds 
between  parties. Due to the cost of iteration, 
practitioners see ZKPs as unsuitable in practice and 
therefore develop other tools to avoid using ZKPs.  
The proposed approach creates new protocols that 
allow the prover to prove knowledge of a secret 
without revealing it.  The new approach, called a one-
round zero-knowledge-proof (1-R ZKP), meets all the 
requirements of ZKPs, yet runs in a single round. The 
new approach substantially reduces the running-time 
complexity and communications cost.  It eliminates the 
iteration cost and makes such proofs suitable for 
practical cryptographic systems for both governmental 
and commercial applications.  
 
2. ZKPs overview 
 
A Zero-knowledge proof is used when someone (the 
prover) has to prove to someone else (the verifier) 
his/her knowledge of some secret information while the 
prover is not willing to reveal the secret. In 
cryptographic literature they are usually named Peggy 
(prover) and Victor (verifier). [12] 
The usual method for Peggy to prove her 
knowledge of the secret is to tell Victor the secret. But 
then, he also gets to know about it and can tell it to 
anybody he wants. The secret is no longer secret. 
Another method is using zero-knowledge proofs. 
Through these, Peggy can prove to Victor that she does 
have the secret but it does not give Victor any 
information about what the secret is. These proofs take 
the form of an interactive protocol. If Peggy knows the 
secret, she can answer victor’s “questions” correctly, 
but if she doesn’t, then there is a certain probability 
that she cannot successfully cheat to answer correctly. 
By repeating the steps for many iterative rounds, the 
probability that she cheats successfully can be brought 
down to within a very small fraction. Without iteration, 
Peggy can pass any particular round with a 50% 
probability without knowing the secret. By repeating 
the steps of the protocol, the probability that Peggy 
cheats becomes negligible.  
We present the definition of the zero-knowledge 
proof formally as a class of problems, which is a 
subclass of Interactive Proofs (IP). Let us introduce the 
following definitions from [7] [8]. 
 
Definition: (Negligible function)  
The function f: N → R is called negligible if for all 
c > 0 and sufficiently large n, f(n) < n-c. f is called 
nonnegligible if there exists a c > 0 such that for all 
sufficiently large n, f(n) > n-c.   
 
Definition: (Interactive proof) 
An interactive proof <P,V> for language L is a two-
party protocol in which a computationally unrestricted 
prover, P, interacts with a probabilistic polynomial-
time verifier, V, by exchanging messages. Both parties 
share a common input x. At the end, V either accepts or 
rejects and both completeness and soundness properties 
hold. 
 
Definition: (Completeness property) 
For any c > 0 and sufficiently long x ∈ L, 
Probability (V accepts x) > 1 - |x|-c.  
In other words, an interactive proof (protocol) is 
complete if, given an honest prover and an honest 
verifier, the protocol succeeds with overwhelming 
probability. 
 
Definition: (Soundness property) 
For any c > 0 and sufficiently long x ∉ L, 
Probability (V accepts x) < |x|-c, (i.e. negligible), even if 
the prover deviates from the prescribed protocol.  
In other words, if the prover does not know the 
secret, her chance to pass the proof successfully is 
negligible.   
 
Definition: (Zero-knowledge proof) 
An interactive proof <P,V> is called zero-
knowledge if for every probabilistic polynomial-time 
V*, there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial-
time simulator (algorithm) Mv* that on inputs x ∈ L 
produces probability distributions Mv*(x) polynomially 
indistinguishable from the distributions <P,V*> (x). 
“Polynomially indistinguishable” means that there 
exists no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm 
which can decide with better than negligible error 
probability, when given a polynomial number of 
samples, from which of the distributions they are 
drawn. 
 
3. Classical problems 
 
It is important to distinguish between three 
different, but related, issues regarding zero-knowledge 
proofs: (1) the application that uses the zero-
knowledge proof, (2) the problem for which the zero-
knowledge proof is built, and (3) the cryptographic 
scheme (technique) used to build the proof. 
The problems for which zero-knowledge proofs are 
built vary according to the application they are used 
for. In each problem, the prover wants to prove the 
knowledge of some secret without revealing any 
information about the secret itself. Typically the secret 
is just a solution (or a witness) of the problem. The 
following examples are some of the classical problems 
used for ZKPs: the discrete logarithm, the square root 
problem, graph isomorphism, the equality of two 
discrete-logs, and one of two discrete-logs. In general, 
these problems belong to a class of problems known as 
NP problems. There is no known efficient (polynomial 
time) algorithm to solve any of these problems. 
However, the solution can be verified in polynomial 
time. In this section, we discuss the existing iterative 
ZKP of a problem that is widely used for e-commerce 
applications. Then, in Section 4, we show how the 
same problem can have more efficient one-round ZKP.   
 
 
Discrete-logarithm (DL) problem 
 
Peggy, the prover, wants to prove in zero-
knowledge that she knows the discrete logarithm of a 
given number. That is, given a large prime p, a 
generator g for the multiplicative group Zp, and b ∈ Zp, 
Peggy wants to prove in zero-knowledge that she 
knows x such that  
gx = b (mod p) 
Solving a DL problem is known to be 
computationally infeasible. Therefore, people are 
interested in proving the knowledge of such a secret 
without revealing it. This is the basic problem for ZKP 
and many applications have been built using the ZKP 
of this problem [2] [3] [9] [6] [1] [14]. 
 
Solution: This solution can be found in [3]. 
Initially, Peggy and Victor both know the generator g 
and b. Peggy generates a random r and computes h = gr 
mod p. She sends h to Victor. Then, Victor flips a coin 
and conveys the outcome to Peggy. If it is heads, Peggy 
sends r to Victor and he verifies gr = h. If it is tails, she 
sends m = x + r and Victor verifies gm = b⋅h. These 
steps are repeated until Victor is convinced that Peggy 
must know x with probability of (1-2-k), where k is the 
number of times these steps are repeated. Figure 2 
summarizes this iterative protocol of ZKP of the DL 
problem. 
 
  Peggy (P) Victor (V) 
0  g, b, p, x g, b, p 
1 P generates random r r  
2 P sends h = g
r
 mod p  
to V h h 
3 V flips a coin,  
c = H or T c c ∈ {H, T} 
4 If c = H,   P sends r to V  
verifies: 
gr = h 
5 If c = T,   P sends m = x + r m = x + r 
verifies: 
gm = b⋅h 
6 
Steps 1-5 are repeated until Victor is convinced 
that Peggy must know x (with probability 1-2-k, 
for k rounds). 
Figure 1: ZKP of DL problem 
 
The ZKP of the DL problems play a major role in 
many applications, such as multi-media security [3], 
identity verification [9], smart cards [14], digital cash 




4. New Approach:  
One-Round Zero-Knowledge Proofs 
 
The goal of our new approach is to eliminate the 
iterations in the existing ZKPs. Although they are 
useful for many applications, iterative ZKPs have high 
computation and communication costs. We propose a 
new approach to create protocols that satisfiy the 
requirements of the existing ZKPs, but run in one 
round. This reduces the cost of ZKP substantially.     
  
4.1. One-round ZKP of DL problem 
 
Here is a one-round protocol for Peggy to prove in 
zero-knowledge that she knows x such that  
gx = b (mod p) 
Solution: This is a challenge-and-response kind of 
protocol. Victor generates a random y and computes c 
= gy (mod p). He sends c as a challenge to Peggy. 
Peggy responds by computing r = cx (mod p) and 
sending r to Victor. Victor can verify the validity of 
Peggy’s response by verifying that r = by (mod p). The 
chart below summarizes these steps. 
   
  Peggy (P) Victor (V) 
0  g, b, p, x g, b, p 
1 V generates a random y  y 
2 V sends c = gy (mod p) c c = gy 
3 P sends r = cx (mod p) r = cx r 
4 V verifies that    r = by (mod p) 
Figure 2: 1-R ZKP of DL problem 
 
This is a one-round proof based on the framework. 
All parameters are set up at Step 0. There are no more 
auxiliary messages needed for this protocol.  
Proof of correctness: If Peggy knows the secret x, 
she just computes and sends r = cx. Since Victor knows 
y, he can verify that  r = cx =  gxy = (gx)y = by (mod p). 
However, if Peggy does not know x, she cannot 
compute r. According to Diffie-Hellman assumption 
[11], it is computationally infeasible to find gxy 
knowing only gx and gy. Moreover, this one-round 
protocol does not reveal any information about the 




Both iterative and one-round ZKPs are useful tools 
to deal with security and privacy issues in e-commerce 
applications. We discuss here the advantage of the one-
round ZKP and compare its performance to the existing 
iterative ZKP.  
The approach of the one-round ZKP is superior to 
the iterative approach in the following measures: (1) 
better execution-time complexity – saves local 
computations; (2) less communication cost – exchanges 
much less information in terms of bits; and (3) less 
latency – exchange fewer messages over the internet or 
the network. The following table summarizes the 
results. 
 
 1-R ZKP Iterative ZKP 
execution-time t2 log t log log t t3 log t log log t 
communication 2t 2t2 
latency 2d 2td + d 




Zero-knowledge proofs can be used whenever there 
is critical data to exchange while only proving the 
possession of such data is needed. ZKPs are the natural 
tools to meet the challenges in many applications that 
deal with both security and privacy. The existing ZKPs 
are iterative, which implies high computation and 
communication costs. Therefore, researchers may not 
see ZKPs suitable in practice and try to develop other 
tools to avoid using ZKPs. 
The proposed one-round ZKP overcomes the 
iteration problem. It allows the prover to prove the 
knowledge of a secret without revealing it and meet all 
the requirements of ZKPs, yet runs in one round. This 
reduces the computation and communication cost 
substantially and makes the new ZKPs more practical. 
 In this paper, we have presented a one-round ZKP 
for the discrete-logarithm problem. The same approach 
can be used for other problems. We have shown that 
the new one-round ZKP is superior to the existing ones 
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